Oil profits tracker

The US and Israeli strikes on Iran on 28 February 2026 triggered the sharpest spike in crude oil prices since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. By 6 April, EU pump prices had reached €2.11/L for diesel and €1.88/L for petrol — up 54 and 26 cents per litre respectively in the pre-conflict period. Filling a 55-litre diesel tank cost almost €30 more than before the conflict began.

The same dynamic was observed in 2022, following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, EU drivers paid a collective geopolitical premium of around €55 billion over the course of the year. Oil companies — particularly refiners — did not simply pass on higher input costs, their margins expanded. EU refining profits tripled between 2021 and 2022.

If current conditions are maintained until the end of 2026, this analysis estimates excess profit would be generated across the road fuel supply chain — €26 billion accruing to refiners and distributors operating largely within the EU, and €64 billion flowing to crude oil producers and oil-producing nations. This is based on Dated Brent, the price for real cargoes delivered in the next few weeks. Previously, our tracker used Brent front-month prices, but for reasons detailed below the tracker now uses Dated Brent prices. However, if front-month prices are used, we find that €36 billion would be accruing to refiners and distributors operating largely within the EU, and €53 billion flowing to crude oil producers and oil-producing nations.

The methodological note sets out the analytical approach, key assumptions, and where the estimates are likely to over- or understate reality.

The EU should implement a tax on excess profits and use the funds to support Europeans to become less vulnerable to future oil shocks.

What does the tracker show?

T&E’s tracker estimates excess profits along the EU road fuel supply chain, using European Commission Weekly Oil Bulletin pump price data and Brent crude oil prices, compared against a pre-conflict baseline of January–February 2026.

The analysis separates the supply chain into two segments. Upstream excess revenues — from selling crude oil at elevated prices — flow primarily to oil-producing states, state-owned companies and the upstream operations of international oil companies. These are largely beyond the reach of EU policy. Downstream excess revenues are different. Captured through expanded refining and distribution margins, the majority of these profits are realised within the EU and could fall within the scope of a windfall profits tax.

Margins and excess profits may move in either direction from here. If the crisis deepens, margins and profits will increase; if it stabilises or resolves, they will compress. History suggests excess profits are temporary and are a feature of acute market dislocation, not a permanent condition.

On 21 April, The Economist published an article showing that in April gross-profit margins for north-west European refiners had fallen from their oil crisis peak, and even turned negative. This was based on Dated Brent, the price for real cargoes delivered in the next few weeks, rather than what our tracker used previously - Brent front-month prices.

Under normal market conditions, the spread between these two benchmarks is minimal. Using the EUCRBRDT Index — the standard benchmark for European physical crude, representing the Dated Brent Europe Spot Price — we have estimated what difference this spread makes to our excess profit calculations.

The spread between Dated Brent and front-month Brent has evolved markedly through the conflict:

• Pre-conflict (2–27 February): average spread of $1.75

• Early weeks of the war (3–31 March): spread remained relatively contained, averaging $4.09

• First half of April (1–16 April): spread spiked sharply, averaging $29.09

• Second half of April (17–29 April): spread has since narrowed, averaging $7.45

This pattern shows that while Dated Brent remains elevated relative to front-month prices, the acute dislocation of early April has partially subsided.

One important uncertainty remains: we cannot observe how individual European refiners are using futures contracts and hedging strategies to manage their exposure to rising crude costs — a complexity discussed in detail in our methodological note. Depending on their hedging positions, actual refiner profits could be higher or lower than either benchmark implies.

A solidarity contribution

The EU has acted before. The solidarity contribution — a 33% levy on fossil fuel profits exceeding 20% above the 2018–21 average — raised an estimated €28 billion in 2022–23 before lapsing.

The mechanism exists. The case for reinstating it is strong. Excess profits from geopolitical shocks are temporary by nature; they will evaporate as markets stabilise, refining margins will revert toward their long-run average and the windfall will evaporate. However, EU consumers are bearing another cost of living crisis they did not cause. Starting to act now — even on the basis of preliminary data — sends a clear signal of fairness: that when oil companies profit from conflict, those profits are shared with the public bearing the burden. Policymakers can begin to act in principle and refine the mechanism as more data strengthens the evidence base. Waiting for certainty risks waiting until the moment of injustice has passed. It should be noted that any windfall profit claw back like mechanism would be on the basis of end-of-fiscal-year accounting.

Why are profits for diesel and petrol so different?

European diesel refining margins have outpaced other regions, reflecting a structural shortfall in domestic refining capacity. Europe’s vehicle fleet has a comparatively high share of diesel cars, and the Middle East is typically the lowest-cost source of middle distillates, the key input to diesel. By contrast, petrol margins have been more subdued due to high inventories in the US and Europe, weak seasonal demand, and the Middle East’s limited role in petrol supply. Further, despite a diesel-heavy vehicle fleet, the EU remains more structurally dependent on diesel than petrol imports. With around 20% of Europe's diesel imported, these excess profits will flow to non-EU firms; this will limit the effectiveness of any EU-based windfall tax.