Last chance to get it right: The Industrial Accelerator Act will make or break Europe’s battery industry
How the Franco-German auto deal, a wide Made-with-EU scope, and carmakers abandon Europe’s battery value chain to foreign competitors
Getting the Industrial Accelerator Act right
There is a growing consensus that Europe must reduce its reliance on Chinese cleantech, especially batteries
The IAA marks a major shift in EU industrial policy. It introduces Union content incentives to ensure scarce public subsidies and corporate tax incentives are used to support European manufacturing. This demand-side pull is crucial if the energy transition is to deliver high-value industrial jobs and lessen critical geopolitical dependencies. There is a growing consensus that Europe must reduce its reliance on Chinese cleantech, especially batteries. But several proposals currently before co-legislators risk severely undermining that overarching goal. Diluting battery criteria in the IAA means giving up on a strategic value chain for Europe, leaving it to China only.
T&E’s assessment shows that only an IAA with a calibrated timeline, robust battery requirements and a strict geographical scope will deliver substantial benefits for Europe. Without secured demand, announced industrial capacity will simply not materialise.
The Franco-German automotive deal from 16 October 2026 is a major blow for Europe’s battery industry as it severely dilutes incentives for batteries. It suggests battery sourcing requirements for eligible vehicles of 10% in 2028-2029, 20% in 2030-2031 and 70% from 2032 on. This is far below what the market already does: over 50% of cells in electric vehicles (EVs) sold in the EU are already Made-in-Europe. By 2030, the deal would only secure 13% (62 GWh) of Europe’s announced cell production: a further 206 GWh would likely find European buyers, though with no guarantee, while 220 GWh would find no demand at all. Even in 2032, the 70% would still not secure a substantial share of potential cell capacity (only 45%).
Another major risk is applying a wide Made-with-EU geographical scope to battery criteria. Compared to a strict EU-only scope, including free trade agreement (FTA) partners puts around 100 GWh of cell demand and 250 GWh of cathode active materials (CAM) demand at risk of leakage in 2030. Limiting the scope to trusted partners only helps to a limited extent. Since Europe can produce enough cells to meet demand under a Made-in-EU IAA, adding partner countries risks leaving EU production without offtakers: even with trusted partners only, a third of potential EU cell supply could be affected. For CAM, around 30% of expected EU supply could be left without a buyer under a trusted-partners scope, rising to 50% under an extended one.
The midstream, CAM and their precursors (pCAM), is the weakest link in Europe’s battery value chain. Boosting this key segment and diversifying away from China is essential for resilience as it shields European industry from supply disruptions and export controls. Under a strict Made-in-EU scope, reaching IAA CAM requirements is technically and commercially viable by 2030, requiring only limited sourcing from trusted partners (33 GWh cell-equivalent). From 2032, EU production can cover demand from EVs under support schemes. A Made-in-EU IAA would generate 323 GWh of extra EU CAM demand in 2032, around the output of six mid-sized EU CAM plants, bringing total EU-made CAM to 407 GWh (securing 94% of expected EU supply).
pCAM is just as vital for resilience and to establish local offtake for European refiners and recyclers. A 28% EU pCAM requirement in 2032 applied to a carmaker’s entire fleet sales (not only for vehicles eligible for public support) creates enough demand for expected EU supply to materialise and projects to reach Final Investment Decision (FID). Onshoring CAM and pCAM adds only a modest cost of $10.6/kWh for Nickel Manganese Cobalt (NMC) and $6.5/kWh for Lithium Iron Phosphate (LFP) batteries. This is a necessary sovereignty premium that will fall as the EU supply chain matures.
The car CO₂ standards are as critical to industrial delivery as the IAA. Even under a strict Made-in-EU scope, the European Parliament’s position as approved by the leading committee in November 2026 would sharply cut expected EV sales and reduce EU cell demand by 247 GWh between 2027 and 2032, which equals 3.7 million EU made EVs.
Finally, the proposed fleet booster mechanism fails to drive industrial onshoring and relocation if its compliance trigger is set below 85%. Carmakers’ efforts to lower that threshold aim at getting a stamp of approval on their sourcing strategy in China. A major risk for public subsidies ending up benefiting imported cars with Chinese batteries. Attempts to lower the Booster below a 85% threshold should be rejected, especially if combined with weaker battery criteria.
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Only 13% of announced EU cell production in 2030 secured by the Franco-German deal
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100 GWh & 250 GWh of cell and CAM demand could leak abroad because of a wide Made-with-EU scope
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Kill 247 GWh of EU cell production from 2027-2032 with weakened car CO₂ standards —3x the annual capacity of EU largest battery plant (LG ES in Poland)
Key recommendations
It's key to reject the Franco-German deal proposal on batteries
Battery criteria in this deal are too weak to create additional demand and undermine the IAA’s core purpose.
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1
Reject the Franco-German deal proposal on batteries: Battery criteria in this deal are too weak to create additional demand and undermine the IAA’s core purpose.
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2
Maintain the Commission's core timeline and cell/cathode criteria: enforce cell requirements by 2027/28 and CAM by 2030. Retain Article 13 in full to guarantee a strict EU scope for corporate fleets, securing offtake for ~60% of the EV market.
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3
Include trusted partners only where justified: Set EU27 + European Economic Area (EEA) and the UK as the default baseline. The UK should be included given its integration into the EU battery value chain via the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) and the scale of investments already committed. If trusted partners are included, strict selection criteria are needed to alleviate circumvention and offshoring.
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4
Add minimum thresholds for midstream: at least 20% for pCAM and 10% for Anode Active Material (AAM) for 2032 to build domestic midstream capacity to diversify from China. Include a 20% threshold for lithium, nickel, cobalt and graphite.
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5
Reject weakened fleet booster proposal: anything below a 85% fleet-wide compliance trigger removes the incentives to onshore production in Europe and ends up subsidising imported vehicles.
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