“The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must,” wrote the Greek historian Thucydides 2500 years ago. His words haven’t lost any of their salience (see this great Davos speech by Mike Carney).
The Greenland crisis showed that if Europe shows spine, it can be strong. It must now apply that lesson to industrial policy, or suffer the consequences.
Today, Europe has strategic autonomy in vehicle production - just about, see the Nexperia chips saga. In the essential shift to electrification - crucial for climate, security and future jobs - the EU cannot afford to lose this autonomy.
Can Europe go electric and remain sovereign? It all depends on batteries.
One year ago, with Northvolt bankrupt, Europe’s battery dream lay in tatters. And yet in late 2025 PowerCo and Verkor, two European companies, started churning out cells, joining ACC which had started a year earlier. Umicore, a Belgian company, is producing cathodes in Poland.
What’s emerging is the kind of diverse battery industry the EU needs, with European and Chinese companies adding to the existing (mostly) South Korean capacity (e.g. LG, Samsung).
Factories are spread all across Europe, and the expected 600 GWH of gigafactory capacity would enable production of around 8 mn BEVs per year in 2030. That’s enough to supply Europe and export some EVs.
Reality check
A lot of analysis based on announcements and nameplate capacity stops at this point. In reality, things are a bit more complicated.
First, even though nameplate capacity suggests the EU is already ‘autonomous’, in reality it is a large importer of battery cells from both China (28%) and Korea (2%). Germany is one of the prime - but by no means the only EU - destinations for Chinese EV battery exports which are cheaper than EU produced cells.
Verkor and PowerCo have only just started production. It will take years for their factories to produce at the same quality and efficiency of their Asian competitors. Industry experts estimate some of the existing European gigafactories to have actual output of just 20% of their nameplate capacity right now.
The reality is the Europeans are in the battery valley of death. Survival is not guaranteed. It will take years of disciplined execution and EU support - more on that later.
So, all of a sudden the picture looks a lot bleaker with Europe mostly dependent on Asian batteries.
South Korea
Companies like LG Chem, Samsung and SK On localised in Europe and went through production hell years ago. South Korea is a trusted partner for the EU. Its companies are a key pillar of a diverse battery industry.
But as NMC producers, they too are at risk. The Chinese market has shifted away from NMC/NCA to now around 80% LFP, mainly because it is cheaper.
China
Today most Chinese cells come directly from factories in mainland China. This changes once CATL’s plants in Hungary and Spain start to produce at scale. Cathodes and other inputs will continue to be imported from China and its lossmaking and subsidised LFP supply chain.
EU and Korean producers are much more likely to rely on local cathode producers like Umicore, or Ecopro BM (Korean, but localised). Cathodes, including their key building blocks CAM and pCAM, account for around 30% of the added value of batteries and are a key piece of the puzzle if the EU wants to derisk its supply chains.
And so the reality is that by 2030, China may completely dominate the EU battery market, especially if European producers are forced out of the market.
Can Europe keep its battery dream alive?
In short, a diverse EU battery supply chain remains possible. But action is needed.
So far, the EU has failed to muster significant financial support for battery producers. It has also shown to be unwilling to impose tariffs on imported cells and cathodes, despite evidence that the Chinese battery supply chain is heavily subsidised.
And so all eyes are now on the local content rules the EU will adopt as part of the so-called Industry Accelerator Act (due 25 February).
The act will likely restrict all public support and tax breaks for cars sold in Europe - so around 60% of EU BEV sales, not all cars! - to vehicles meeting certain local content requirements.
The key questions the EU Commission needs to answer are:
What components must be produced locally? Just cells, or also cathodes, CAM and pCAM?
Whether to distinguish between chemistries or to set the same targets for NMC and LFP localisation.
Does #MadeinEU really mean EU27, or will we also consider countries the EU has trade deals with as European (e.g. Korea or Vietnam, i.e. everyone but China)?
These choices will determine to what extent there will be a diverse and/or European battery industry in 2030. Indeed, low targets, with looser rules for LFP, and half of the world qualifying as #MadeInEU, would fail to stop the Chinese dominance scenario described above.
We believe all cells for EVs covered by the IAA should be produced in Europe. The same principle (perhaps with different timing) should apply to cathodes, with the same rules for both NMC and LFP. And Europe should mean Europe for key components like cells and cathodes. For materials, processing and refining, the EU can be more flexible.
Carmakers are split on the EU’ effort prioritise “made in Europe” products, despite the backing of 1,000 European chief execs. Some like Volkswagen, Stellantis and Renault back local content (although with different definitions). Others like BMW oppose the idea, pretending the old world order is still alive, because it suits their short term interests.
Opposition often boils down to local content rules requiring (significant) changes in industrial plans. Well, indeed, that’s exactly the point.
The coming years will test Europe like no other. We need vision and plans, but as the old Greek historian noted: to succeed, you above all need to act and move forward without hesitation. While it is still strong, Europe must do what it can.
